How flawed institutional design fuels conflict in fragile nations

A new discussion paper explores how institutional design influences cooperation, competition, and conflict in developing nations. The study focuses on Afghanistan and Papua New Guinea (PNG), where patronage and clientelism have long shaped government structures. Both countries have seen reform efforts, but outcomes remain uneven due to deep-rooted political and social factors. In Afghanistan, the post-2001 institutional framework unintentionally fuelled rivalry and instability. Frequent leadership changes weakened administrative capacity, as patronage networks dominated appointments. Reforms created pockets of professionalism, yet many institutions struggled to function effectively under persistent conflict.

In PNG, decentralisation reforms were later rolled back, leading to poor coordination and delays in public services. Patronage there encouraged cooperation within political networks but hindered broader collaboration. This dynamic often escalated into destructive competition, further undermining governance. The paper highlights that building impartial state institutions is not just a technical challenge. Success depends on aligning reforms with historical, political, and social realities. Without this alignment, even well-intended changes may fail to improve governance.

The findings suggest that institutional design can either foster cooperation or deepen conflict, depending on local incentives. In fragile contexts, reforms must account for existing power structures to achieve lasting stability. The study underscores the need for politically aware approaches to institutional development.